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ABSTRACT
This is an attempt at depicting welfare state developments in one of its most notable success
stories: Sweden. As a major subsector of the Nordic country’s welfare state, this paper focuses
on the evolution of social insurance, particularly the public old-age pension system from its
liberal beginnings in 1913 all the way to 1998, when the novel three-tiered pension system was
introduced. In addition to its policy emphasis, this paper examines the relationship between the
welfare state and social democracy by studying the implications that cross class alliances and
social reformism had on the political viability of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.
Though it is a case study, the aim of this thesis is to shed light on a vital institution in all
industrialized societies and to hopefully serve not only those curious about Sweden’s experience
but anyone with a preliminary interest in social policy or welfare state studies.
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INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt at depicting and explaining welfare state developments in one of
its most notable success stories: Sweden. Evidently, the forces of industrialization, urbanization,
and liberalism had a profound role to play in Sweden’s early economic development, but
democratic consolidation along with sociopolitical mobilization were major players behind the
institutionalization of its welfare state. Throughout this paper, two guiding theoretical
frameworks are therefore followed: (1) The Swedish welfare state belongs to the cluster of
highly-decommodified and marginally-stratified welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990);
(2) Social Democracy in Sweden, like in its neighboring Denmark and Norway, through
parliamentary participation and forging electoral alliances between key social classes, succeeded
in advancing its reformist agenda first in the 1930s and then again in the late 1950s (EspingAndersen, 1985). To illustrate these principles, the development of Sweden’s public old-age
pension system is traced since 1913 to 1998, when the novel three-tiered pension system was
introduced. Hence, the temporal focus of this thesis spans early to late Twentieth century.
Being a case study of Sweden, this thesis is based on an extensive literature review, made
possible by the efforts of many field experts and academic scholars. As previously hinted at, two
major works that contained ideas that served both as a source of inspiration and direction for this
paper are The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) and Politics Against Markets: The
Social Democratic Road to Power (1985), both authored by Danish sociologist Gosta EspingAndersen. In addition to others, Chapter 3, which chronicles the development of Sweden’s old-
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age pension system, relies on the contributions of Hagan (2013) in his A History of the Swedish
Pension System.
Chapter 1 is meant to introduce the concept of the welfare state, as an institution of
modernity within developed countries, by reviewing its history, sectors, regimes, and other
associated definitions.
A welfare state study could not be complete without reviewing Sweden’s prosperous
economic transformation as well as the story of her political democratization; all focal points of
Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 focuses on the evolution of the Swedish public pension system up until 1959,
when the earnings-related supplementary pension reform was passed in parliament.
Chapter 4 which tackles the 1998 major reform also attempts to answer one curious and
somewhat natural question: Did the new reform adhere to the once established decommodified
and universalist character of Sweden’s welfare state advanced by Esping-Andersen (1990)?
Finally, a conclusive section revisits the main analytical points discussed in this paper
and introduces future research questions and suggestions.
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CHAPTER 1: THE WELFARE STATE AS A MODERN INSTITUTION

Historical Overview of Welfare Developments in Europe and North America
One story of early welfare state developments took place in the late nineteenth century
Imperial Germany where Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck introduced his compulsory social
insurance programs. During this time period, the ongoing industrialization process in Europe and
the spread of liberal ideas have already been transforming the way social problems were
perceived. A new understanding of these problems emerged: One that viewed unemployment
and other social risks in the light of the business cycle (as cited in Briggs, 1961) and paved the
way for the working class to pursue what it deemed were its social rights (Kuhnle & Sander,
2010). On their part, nation-states through welfare measures attempted to address the social and
political unrest that industrialization brought about. When he implemented his insurance
programs, Bismarck, for instance, sought to suppress the socialist opposition and solidify the
German workers’ loyalty to the state (Kuhnle &; Sander, 2010). Nation-states also used welfare
to invest in the well-being of their citizens, not strictly out of moral obligation, but these states
understood that the might of their nations depended on the welfare of their citizens (Gamble,
2016). Nation-building and competition between European nations were thus instrumental
factors behind the Nineteenth century state consolidation and expansion of power and, therefore,
welfare provision (Gamble, 2016).Though the nature and scope of each state’s welfare trajectory
depended on complex historical circumstances, social insurance programs were visible
throughout Europe and by the end of World War I. In Sweden, the Liberal government
introduced the first universal contributory old age pension plan in 1913; the French government
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subsidized a large-scale voluntary unemployment insurance in 1905; and Liberal Britain has
already had a means-tested old age pension program (1908) and the National Insurance Act
(1911) in place (Kuhnle & Sander, 2010). The period following the end of the First World War
also witnessed a general agreement among European parties from across the political spectrum
on the desirability of welfare programs (Gamble, 2016). As suffrage was then enjoyed by
virtually all citizens, political parties on the Left gradually and successfully spread their welfare
convictions through winning parliamentary majorities and controlling government bureaucracies
(Gamble, 2016). The increasingly widespread and expansive social security plans and the notion
of the state being responsible for their administration, therefore, heavily influenced the PostWorld War I social policy not only in Europe but also across the Atlantic in the American
continent (Kuhnle & Sander, 2010).
The attack on the legitimacy of the old liberal order soon intensified as the 1929 Great
Depression unfolded. Traditional Laissez-Faire capitalism was no longer believed to sustain the
demands of neither the domestic nor the international political economy. Throughout the 1930s,
welfare reforms were executed in an incremental fashion (Gamble, 2016), and social insurance
plans were characterized by a great variation as states grappled with newer and broader social
risks (Kuhnle & Sander, 2010). In the United States, however, the enactment of the 1935 Social
Security Act represented a major departure for the federal government to centralize its
intervention in mitigating social risks and set new standards for its legitimacy in an exceptionally
favorable political context. The American welfare state was thus effectively established out of
President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Meanwhile in Europe, a fundamental transformation
of social policy was not in full effect until the outbreak of World War II (Gamble, 2016). The
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WWII period was characterized by a newfound focus on universal welfare as a route to peace
and prosperity, as “the intensity of the struggle for national survival brought with it the demands
for a new domestic order as well as a new world order”. (Gamble, 2016, p.18). This was
ultimately reflected in the United Kingdom’s 1942 Beveridge Report, which called out the
“Giant Evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness” (p.79) as the underlying
problems the government ought to fight (Kuhnle & Sander, 2010). Although it corresponded to
various sets of social programs depending on its country of origin, following the end of WWII,
the welfare state had been established as a vital component in all industrialized states, setting the
stage for what was known as its “Golden Age”. The welfare institution has come to be
effectively regarded as an indispensable element of modernity and the market economy. This
was largely due to the remarkable economic growth of the period centered around a Keynesian
determination to full-employment and higher expenditures. Governments were no longer limited
to delivering social insurance programs, but through a myriad other laws and protections, they
effectively ensured that social programs and services were accessible to those deemed eligible.

The Welfare State: Definitions and Sectors
In the Welfare State: A Very Short Introduction, Garland (2016) describes the welfare
state generally as “a mode of government and an institutional dimension of modern society”
(p.6) that takes various and distinctive forms across states and changes over time. It should not,
in his view, be seen an idea associated only with one specific political ideology or a hinderance
against economic growth since it provides a viable economic and social environment for the
sustainability of all capitalist economies. Garland (2016) also offers three conceptual
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perspectives through which its functions and extent are institutionally defined. Beginning with a
narrow definition that characterizes the welfare state strictly as a non-contributory and meanstested system for the poor, the unpopularity of this conceptualization often renders the welfare
state subject to criticism in the public political debate. A more inclusive definition focuses on the
social provisions that benefit a wider segment of the population, and these include, for instance,
social insurance, and social services; the former being the focus of Chapter 3 and 4 in the case of
Sweden’s old-age pension system. This second conceptualization, according to Garland (2016),
targets the “core elements” (p.8) of the welfare state, which are celebrated and supported across
the political spectrum. Lastly, his third definition broadly studies the government-welfare state
relationship in terms of the state’s intervention in the economy manifested in various macroeconomic policies and how these impact welfare indicators, such as full employment and
economic growth.
According to Garland (2016), the welfare state generally consists of five sectors: social
assistance, social insurance, publicly funded social services, social work and personal social
services, and economic governance:
•

Social assistance encompasses all non-contributory programs designed to help only
those who demonstrate financial need. Examples of social assistance programs
include Food Stamps, Earned Income Tax Credits, Medicaid, and TANF in the U.S as
well as Income Support in the U.K.

•

Social insurance schemes are typically state administered, designed to provide
protection against unemployment risks confronted in the labor market, such as
sickness, injury, old age...etc. Unlike social assistance programs, they are
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contributory, and enrollment is compulsory for the majority, if not all, of the
population. Social Security in the US is the classic example for social insurance
programs.
•

Publicly funded social services: Universally accessible to everyone and are therefore
the most egalitarian. Education services, museums, libraries, minimum wages, and
other free of charge services or rights fall into this category.

•

The social work and personal social services sector is primarily concerned with
providing support and care for families and other vulnerable members of society such
as mentally ill persons and offenders, who lack community support. Childcare
services and home-based care for the elderly are other examples of social work and
personal social services.

•

Government of the economy: to address and manage the economic fluctuations
associated with market capitalism, the welfare state employs a variety of policy
instruments. Tax and subsidy laws, fiscal and monetary policies, labor market
policies, federal regulations and other measures enable the welfare state to control the
economy at large.

Esping-Andersen’s Welfare State Clusters
In his highly influential book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen
(1990) argues that welfare state analyses that linearly define and classify this institution in light
of measures such as expenditure levels, economic growth, and income redistribution are
inadequate. The welfare state, the author explains, ought not be divorced from its theoretical
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underpinnings that address and specify the relationships between welfare state actors: The
market, the individual’s social class, and his/her family role. It is in light of these relationships
that welfare states in capitalist societies distinctly cluster into three regimes: Liberal,
conservative, and social-democratic.
To study the individual’s relationship to the market, Esping-Andersen (1990) develops
his decommodification concept; that is, to which extent does the individual’s “commodity” status
that he/she inevitably inherits in the market interferes with his/her receiving of social rights
solely based on citizenship?
Being an underlying concern for modern social policy, decommodification, the author
argues, does not imply a complete eradication of wage labor as a commodity, but rather, “the
degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living
independently of market participation” (p.37). The commodification of labor crystallized on a
grand scale with the breakthrough of capitalism, as more workers increasingly depended on the
cash nexus to satisfy their needs and provide for their well-being, abandoning the traditional
welfare institutions like the Church, the family, or the feudal lord (Ibid). The conservative
response to this dilemma was a rejection of what it deemed were the degrading, atomizing, and
corruptive effects of commodification. The statist legacy for example, seen in Bismarck’s social
insurance laws, sought to preserve the existing social order by binding social rights to state
loyalty. Liberalism, on the other hand, departed from a strict abhorrence for the extension of
social rights to introducing minimal assistance schemes and social insurance arrangements that
nonetheless were not to crowd out market efficiency.
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In the liberal welfare state regime, in which there is a strong emphasis on the principles
of self-reliance, individualism, and freedom from paternalism and government interference, the
market is emancipatory and takes precedence in benefit provision. Typically, the state only
intervenes when the market fails often with means-tested schemes and minimal assistance, a
continuation of the old poor-relief tradition. In the conservative regime, characteristic of
Continental European countries, owing to its historical Catholic Church influences and
corporatist-statist legacies, a strong liberal commitment to the market never fully materialized in
terms of benefit allocation. However, social rights in this regime type are typically structured in
correspondence with occupational hierarchies and the male breadwinner model. Finally, a socialdemocratic regime, dominant in the Scandinavian countries, strives to maximize individual
independence from both the labor market and family reliance, giving way to a universalist
welfare state.
These variations in the decommodifying aspect of the welfare state corresponds to its
second function: Stratification. According to the scholar (1990), the institution is a system of
stratification in its own right as it had always engaged in the re-ordering of social structures and
relations. In other words, besides its known and established income redistributive function, the
welfare state may promote solidarity, occupational/status-related hierarchy, or dualism in its
targeting of benefits. Stratification in the liberal regime, given its commitment to market
participation in welfare provision, generates a dichotomy in social outcomes: Those who
managed to provide for their welfare through market-based solutions, and others subject to
targeted, typically means-tested, measures that are often associated with social stigma.

9

The conservative regime, on the other hand, is stratified based on the state’s granted
privileges to civil servants and salaried employees as well as the recognized status differentials
between various occupational groups, an inherited feature from the old guild systems and mutual
benefit societies. Lastly, stratification in the social-democratic regime, having always been a
struggle against market-cultivated inequalities, is strongly ascribed to the notion of solidarity.
In addition to the historical and theoretical bases of the three welfare state regimes,
Esping-Andersen (1990) also quantified decommodification and stratification for his
classification and comparison purposes. His decommodification score which was calculated for
pensions, sickness, and unemployment benefits in 18 industrialized countries, on one hand, is
measured based on several and varying indicators for each entitlement; in the case of pensions,
for example, minimum amounts, replacement rates, duration for eligibility, and degree of
individual financing are all included variables. Regarding stratification, each regime type is
measured based on its salient characteristics; corporatism (a subcategory of the conservative
regime) is identified based on the number of existing occupationally distinct public pension
systems1.

Data for both variables is from the year 1980, and to access Esping-Andersen’s (1990) empirical
analysis, see (47-54) for decommodification and (65-78) for stratification.
1
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Table 1: Esping-Andersen’s Welfare State Clusters

Regime type

Characteristics

Level of
Decommodification
Low
. Strong commitment to
market dynamics

Examples

Liberal

. Benefits are modest
. Strict entitlement
measures
. Dualist

Conservative

. Benefits are attached to
social/occupational status
. Commitment to
traditional family
structures
. Emphasis on subsidiarity

Moderate
. Lack of serious
concern for market
efficiency

France
Austria
Germany
Italy

Social Democratic

. Universality of benefits
. Cross-class equality
. Aims to maximize
individual independence
from market and family
reliance

High
. Clear preferability for
welfare state solidarity

Sweden
Denmark
Norway

United States
Canada
Australia

Source: Adapted from The Welfare State: A Very Short Introduction (p.65), by D. Garland (2016) New
York, NY: Oxford University Press & The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism by G. Esping-Andersen
(1990) Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

It is important to note, however, and as Esping-Andersen (1990) mentions, that there are
no pure cases in terms of these classifications; a social-democratic welfare state, for instance,
may very much contain liberal or corporatist elements in benefit allocation. In chapter 4 of his
book, moreover, the author (1990) maintains that the study of social rights, such as pensions,
ought to focus on the relationship between public and private initiative, or the state and market,
in order to accurately account for which actor dominates a certain welfare state regime.
For the purposes and scope of this paper and in the case of the old-age pension that it
studies, only the public component and no occupational pensions are covered. In Section 4 of
Chapter 4, I explain that because the 1998 pension reform in Sweden indeed diverged into a
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system where benefits closely depended on contributions, hence market participation, it is fair to
conclude that the characteristics of the new system are more in line with the definitional
properties of the liberal regime type.

A Theory of Social Democracy and the Welfare State
In Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power, Esping-Andersen
(1985) begins by developing an operational definition for social democracy which were to be
used later in his book to explain its success -and by the same token its potential setbacks- in the
three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.
Although it has had revolutionary roots during its infancy, social democracy as a political
movement is committed to parliamentary participation as it “distinguishes itself by the decision
to subordinate class purity to the logic of majority politics” (p.8). National legislation, the main
strategy utilized by social democratic parties in their mission to transform capitalism is also a
means to mobilize class structures and foster solidarity. In the case of Sweden, this is evidently a
function of its welfare state.
Rejecting the Marxist orthodoxies that propose that proletarianization is, for the most
part, the only condition needed to attain socialism (p.26), Esping-Andersen (1985) instead
suggests that the success of social democracy is tied to its relationship with class structures and
its ability to forge alliances between them (class formation). On one hand, class structures such
as those of industrial wageworkers, farmers, or white-collar professionals, crystallize as a result
of the division of labor2 and are thought of as “raw material” upon which class and political

2

As cited in Przworski, 1975; Poulantzas, 1975; and Wright, 1979
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alliances are built3. Class formation, on the other hand, is the process by which these groups are
collectivized for the purposes of political mobilization. There are several conditions upon which
class formation is to be achieved: Decommodification of labor and the promotion of solidarity by
shedding class discourse and strengthening the link between party and union affiliation, for
example. The ultimate and most effective pathway to class formation that also encompasses
these conditions, Esping-Andersen (1985) explains, is through national legislation based on
universalist principles and this once again is where the welfare state comes into play.
Finally, it is crucial to note that the long-term success of the social democratic parties
once in power hinges upon their ability to forge continuous political alliances, a process the
author (1985) refers to as political realignment. Two major instances of political realignment that
this paper will cover are those of the worker-farmer alliance of the 1930s and the wage-earner
alliance that took place in the context of the 1959 earnings-related pension reform.

3

As cited in Przworski, 1975
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
THE FARMER-WORKER ALLIANCE

A welfare state study in any capacity cannot be separated from examining the political
and economic contexts in which it emerged. This chapter therefore gives a concise overview of
the economic and political developments that unraveled in Sweden at end of the 19th century, not
only to inform the reader of the historical experience of the Nordic country, but this chapter also
covers the first instance of political realignment which Esping-Andersen (1985) spoke of.

Sweden’s Economic Development
During the first half of the 19th century and prior to its relatively late industrial
breakthrough, Sweden was primarily an agrarian and rural society, employing more than three
quarters of its population in the agricultural sector (Schon, EHA). By 1870, several indicators of a
rapid economic transformation began to manifest: large-scale investments in key industrial sectors
including iron and steel took place; agricultural exports increased by 20% between 1869 and 1871;
and national income rose by 30% up until 1875 (Jorberg, 1965). From 1850 to 1890 Sweden’s
GDP per capita grew at an impressive rate of 1.5% compared to 0.4% between 1800 and 1850 4,
and employment levels in the industrial sector expanded while those in the agriculture declined.
The “Second Industrial Revolution” around 1900 further provided the country with the foundations
for long-term growth: The creation of sophisticated machinery, such as the electrical motor, and

4

Schon (2012) as cited in Johansson (1967), Krantz (1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1991), Pettersson (1987),
Schon (1988, 1995).
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the spread of scientific knowledge and innovation birthed new companies (AGA, Ericson, SKF,
among others), and increased the wages of Swedish workers5. Sweden’s economic growth indeed
continued at an accelerating rate up until the 1970s, rendering it one of the fastest growth rates
ever recorded (Lindbeck, 1998).
Sweden’s economic success continued into the twentieth century and in 1970, it ranked
fourth among the richest countries in the world (Bergh, 2014). To explain this dramatic
transformation, Bergh (2014) advances an argument that owes Sweden’s prosperity during its
“Golden Years” to the successful development of capitalist institutions. These institutions
manifest in the several economic and political liberalization measures that Sweden implemented
during this time period. Economic liberalization, as explained by Bergh (2014) mainly entails:
- The farming land reforms which began in the Southern Scania region in the late eighteenth
century and continued throughout the country into the nineteenth century. Guaranteeing property
rights for landowners, these reforms incentivized farmers to increase productivity and invited
more people to participate in economic activity.
- The establishment of a developed financial system in the form of private banks, which were
instrumental in financing the private sector through credit and loans.
- Trade liberalization in terms of domestic and foreign trade. Trade regulations and duties
decreased in the mid-19th century and the guild system was ended in 1846.
- Early patent laws which facilitated the export of several Swedish innovations. The earliest
patent law in Sweden was passed in 1834; since then, several successful patented inventions

5

For a more detailed discussion on the effects of the Second Industrial Revolution on the Swedish
economy see (Schon, Economic History Association).
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were subject to export, such as Carl Richard Nyberg’s blowtorch (1881) and Lars Magnus
Ericsson’s hand-micro telephone (1895).
- Another overlooked factor of growth, according to Bergh (2014), is emigration from Sweden to
the United States in the late nineteenth through the early twentieth century and the return of some
of those who emigrated. The latter helped spur economic growth through their successful
business ideas and ventures in Sweden.
One political liberalization measure has to do with anti-corruption and some state-sponsored
efforts to reform the Swedish society. Some of these include investments in infrastructure by
newly established government agencies, wage reforms and the adoption of a meritocratic system
in employment for civil servants; and introducing a law criminalizing office misconduct in 1868
(Bergh, 2014).

Towards Parliamentary Governance and Universal Suffrage
Tings, which were local assemblies where kings were elected, laws were discussed and
adopted, and disputes were resolved, may be viewed as the medieval antecedents for modern
political institutions in Sweden such as the Riksdag (Parliament)6. The latter emerged as a
distinct institution during the 16th century and consisted of four estates or chambers: The
nobility, town leaders, the clergy, and the farmers. In 1617, the first Riksdag Act, instituted
under king Gustav Adolphus, further empowered parliament by requiring the monarch to consult
with the four estates in matters of war and forming alliances7. This was also the time when, as

6
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Congleton (2011); Petersson (2015)
Congleton (2011)
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Petersson (2015) mentions, parliamentary committees had started becoming important working
components within the Riksdag. Periods of absolutism in monarchical rule were however present
subsequently, particularly in the late 17th century and under the reign of king Gustav III in the
late 18th century. It was not until 1809 that the Nordic country began its formative years towards
a parliamentary and democratic mode of government8. The Instrument of Government (IG) of
1809 came into existence following a troubled period in Sweden’s history; one which was
characterized by the assassination of Gustav III in 1792 and the overthrow of his son Gustav IV
in 1809 after Sweden’s Finnish territory was lost to Russia. While the 1809 IG established that
the executive power remained with the monarch, who is responsible for appointing his cabinet
members, it granted the Riksdag the authority to oversee certain legislative and budgetary affairs
(Board, 1970).
From 1809 to 1866, when the four-chambered Riksdag was transformed into a bicameral
body, liberalization was the general political pattern in Sweden, as membership in the estates,
excluding the nobility, was expanded to include more groups, such as industrialists and
university professionals in the case of the town leaders and clerics’ estates respectively 9. Justice
Minister and Chancellor, Baron Louis de Greer, who served under Karl XV, moreover, was a
key political figure that helped transform the structure of the Riksdag in the middle of the 19th
century, by managing to secure consensus in the four estates for the proposed reform 10. The
1866 Riksdag Act provided for the First Chamber, indirectly elected through provincial councils
and where membership was restricted by imposing property requirements. The Second Chamber,

8

Congleton (2011)
Congleton (2011)
10
Ibid
9
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on the other hand, was directly elected; however, its voting eligibility criteria remained
restrictive and only about 200,000 people were qualified to vote after the reform11 (Board; 1970).
Both Congleton (2011) and Board (1970) explain that the First Chamber represented the interests
of the upper echelon of Swedish society at the time made of wealthier landowners and members
of the bureaucracy whereas the Second Chamber preserved the interests of the farmers, who
were to dominate it for the next few decades.
Concurrent with the Riksdag reforms and clearly ever since the introduction of the 1809 IG, the
power of the monarchy had been slowly diminishing against the rising influence of the Riksdag.
In 1876, the office of the Prime Minister was formally established, and up until parliamentary
governance crystallized in 1917 when a majority in the Second Chamber had effectively become
a requirement for a sustained ministry, the king gradually lost control and influence over the
formation of his cabinet (Board, 1970; Petersson, 2015)12.
As Sweden began its industrialization in the late 19th century, calls for universal suffrage
and labor unionism intensified. It was during this time moreover, that the country’s modern
political parties materialized: The Riksdag’s liberal groups merged into the Liberal party in 1899
and the conservative General Electoral Association was founded in 190413. On the other hand,
the birth of the Social Democratic Party (SAP) occurred concomitantly with the rise of the labor

11

According to Sveriges Riksdag (2019), only men were eligible for office in the Second Chamber at this
point, and voters were still faced with certain property and taxed income-related restrictions. Voting in the
First Chamber through provincial councils and towns was also bound by strict tax and wealth criteria
(Congleton, 2011).
12
Interestingly, the introduction of parliamentarism in Sweden (in 1917) took place without any
constitutional revisions, according to Petersson (2015), to the previously stated provision for sole
monarchical rule within the IG of 1809, rendering “the first half-century of democracy…[to be] a
‘constitution-less’ period”.
13
Congleton, 2011; Board, 1970
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movement. “Supported by working men in Sweden who had become acutely aware of their
collective political power” (p.174), the Social Democratic party was founded in 1889 and headed
by Hjalmar Branting, a former employee at the Astronomical Observatory of Stockholm and then
editor-in-chief of the newspaper The Social Democrat (Kent, 2008). Supported by the SAP, the
labor union, Landsorganisationen (LO), was founded in 1898; its employer counterpart, Svenska
Arbetsgivarforeningen (SAF), soon followed in 1902 (Congleton, 2011).
Sweden’s democratization process continued throughout the early years of the twentieth century
under the leadership of Conservative Prime Minister Lindman who proposed a set of reforms that
enabled the expansion of the electorate in the Second Chamber and a modification in the wealthrelated membership requirements in the First Chamber in addition to proportional representation
in both houses and in parliamentary committees14. In effect, reducing voting property
requirements in the Second Chamber meant the breakthrough of universal male suffrage. Further
elimination of voting and electoral restrictions took place between 1918 and 1920 although
membership in the First Chamber remained bound to wealth criteria until 1933 (Congleton,
2011; as cited in Verney 1957, 2015). By 1921, women in Sweden gained the right to vote.
Based on the review above, it is clear that the political evolution in Sweden generally
followed a gradual pattern. Characteristic of this development, moreover, is its peaceful nature;
in the words of Board (1970), not only has the country in its modern history “neither participated
in foreign war nor experienced domestic violence… [but Sweden] suffered no civil war or social
revolution of the kinds which ripped other societies apart during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries” (p.21). Far from asserting that intense conflicts between different social and political

14

Ibid
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groups never emerged, one cannot help but observe that consensus-seeking was the general
tendency in Sweden’s political scene.

The Worker-Farmer Alliance15
Ever since its creation in 1889, the SAP had been considerably influenced by radical
socialist ideological thought16 and even though it received 39% of the vote in the 1917 elections,
its programmatic agenda remained unclear throughout the minority governments of the 1920s.
The turn towards pragmatism came about when in 1928, Per Albin Hansson, the party’s
chairman and future Prime Minister who were to remain in this position almost uninterruptedly
from 1932 to 1946, gave a famous speech in which he referred to Sweden as the Folkhemmet, or
the Peoples’ Home; a place where “there is equality, compassion, cooperation, helpfulness.”
(Schall, 2016; p.37).
In the 1932 elections, the SAP won 42% of the vote and 104 seats in the Riksdag and
given the turbulent economic situation of the period, it was well positioned against the bourgeois
parties in terms of implementing its crisis package and social reforms. In the absence of a
majority, the party was, nonetheless, confronted with the need to form an alliance with the
nonsocialist block. Surprisingly, the latter was none other than the farmers: A party which at the
time was a fervent opponent of the social democratic cause and, like its Norwegian counterpart,
somewhat attracted to fascism. The alliance was struck in exchange for price support legislation
(subsidies) for the agrarians. In the same decade, the historical compromise of the “Saltsjobaden
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The following discussion is based on the work of Esping-Andersen (1985) unless otherwise cited.
Esping-Andersen (1985) explains in greater detail the characteristics of Swedish socialism in the first
chapter of Politics Against Markets (p.22).
16
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Agreement” between the labor and employer organizations was struck in 1938 after a long period
of a mutually strained relationship. In addition to the 1935 pension reform (see Chapter. 3), the
SAP passed an unemployment insurance law, which although was voluntary and contributionbased remained under the supervision of the government (Persson, 1949).
The farmer-worker alliance along with its labor-capital counterpart presided over the
legislative and electoral successes of the SAP in the subsequent period all while weakening their
leftist and bourgeois rivals. In Esping-Andersen’s (1985) eyes, it was due to “the [wellorganized…politically articulate…and committed to democracy] character of the Nordic
peasantry…that offers the most convincing explanation of why Scandinavian social democracy
has succeeded to such an extent, why the Nordic countries pioneered model welfare states…”
(p.88).
Given their complexity and in an effort to isolate and capture welfare state developments
in Sweden, I chose to study social insurance; namely the old-age pension system. Another
important factor behind this selection is the fact that it was within this welfare state sector that a
profound ideological controversy unfolded throughout the 1950s between the SAP and
nonsocialist camp. This was the period, as we shall see, when the Swedish social democracy
entered the era of the wage-earner alliance following the break-up of its worker-farmer
precedent, giving way to yet another political realignment (Esping-Andersen, 1985).
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CHAPTER 3: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWEDEN’S PENSION SYSTEM
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The 1913 Pension Reform
Hagen (2013) explains that prior to the enactment of the 1913 pension system, a
discussion concerning old-age insurance was very much present in the public discourse towards
the end of the 19th century given the several demographic changes that the Swedish society had
been undergoing during this time. First, there is the problem of an increasingly aging population,
particularly in the rural areas in addition to a reduction in infant mortality and fertility rates
following the industrialization breakthrough17. At the time, the responsibility for elderly care fell
mostly on families and relatives while those who lacked any financial or family resources
depended on the poor relief laws administered by local authorities. The latter grew financially
pressurized, according to Hagen (2013), as the costs for their primary social responsibility;
school provision, increased from the late 19th century into the early 20th century. Increased
taxation was the main instrument municipalities pursued to raise revenue, but as economic
inequalities between districts became problematic, shifting the responsibility of providing for
poor relief and school services from local authorities to the national level became an apparent
and a desirable solution (Hagen, 2013). Addressing poverty among the elderly was also a major
catalyst towards enacting the 1913 pension reform as “it was argued that a pension system
would…. provide the elderly with an opportunity to age with ‘dignity’…” (Hagen, 2013, p.17).

17

The other important demographic phenomenon that was problematic at the time, according to Hagen
(2013), was the high emigration levels, particularly of young Swedes; approximately 670,000 people left
the country between 1870 and 1900.
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In 1907, the Old-Age Insurance Commission was created by the right-wing government to
investigate various pension schemes and their viability within the Swedish society. After five
years, the commission presented its final reform proposal comprised of three mandatory
insurance system suggestions: A universal pension system model with flat-rate benefits, a
Bismarckian model18, and a means tested model (Hagen, 2013). In 1913, the parliament
unanimously decided on a hybrid system that combines features of both the Bismarckian and the
means-tested models with a two-tiered benefit level scheme.

18

this simply refers to a contributory system based on the very first insurance laws introduced by
Bismarck in the late nineteenth century. This pension design was not viable as it required excluding all
non-working peoples in Sweden including the politically powerful agrarians and those living in rural
areas, which at the time comprised most of the Swedish population. In addition, this model would be
ineffective in addressing the pressing need to lift the elderly out of poverty and easing the fiscal burdens
on the municipalities (Hagen, 2013).
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Table 2: Developments of Sweden’s Public Pension System (the 1913 and 1935 reforms)

Historical Context

Policy Rationale

Policy Proposals/ Alternatives

Late 19th Century:
. Changing demographics:
- Increasingly aging population
- High emigration levels
. Elderly poor relief fell mostly on relatives
and local authorities, but the latter grew
financially burdened with other
responsibilities (school provision).

. Lift the “worthy”
elderly out of
poverty
. Retire with
dignity

The Old-Age Insurance Commission
formed in 1907 to investigate different
policy designs and presented:
. Universal scheme with flat-rate
benefits: Everyone is entitled to a basic
pension amount.
. Bismarckian system: strictly
contributory; has a strong social
insurance character.
. Means-tested system: only those who
meet eligibility criteria would benefit.

The 1913 pension system did not achieve its . “Liberate workers, The Pension Insurance Commission of
initial goals: Contributory benefits were
farmhands and
which Gustav Moller was a member
meager and short-run poverty among the
small farmers from formed in 1928 to investigate potential
elderly was not addressed. Also, retirees
the risk of
alterations made to the previous pension
mostly depended on the means-tested
becoming a burden system:
component for benefits
to the poor relief,”
. Should the new policy be more
. During the 1930s, Sweden’s economy
in the words of
Bismarckian in nature, in line with
experienced a downturn and a high
Minister of Health
Bourgeois parties’ ambitions? Or should
unemployment rate.
and Social Affairs
it be more redistributive like the social
19
. Beveridgean principles became highly
Gustav Moller
democrats had hoped for?
influential in the social policy debate during
(Lundberg &
. How strong is the link between
the 1930s.
Amark; 2001;
contributions and benefits?
. The Social Democrats ascent to power in
p.162; as cited in
1932.
Moller, 1935).
Source: Adapted from Hagen (2013; pp.15-32), Lundberg & Amark (2001; p.162).
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Policy
Implemented
Universal oldage pension
system (1913):
contained
elements from
2nd and 3rd
alternatives

Description

The 1935
Reform was
yet again a
compromise
between a
strictly
Bismarckian
and
redistributive
models.

. The financing of the new scheme
departed from past contributions and
became largely dependent on current
taxes.
. A basic pension of SEK100 in addition
to 10% of lifetime contributions are to be
paid out for men and women.
. Supplementary benefits: SEK225
annually for men and SEK210 for
women.
. The amount of supplementary benefits
also depended on the cost of living for
where the pensioners lived (regional
heterogeneity).

. 1st tier- based on Bismarckian model:
benefits were completely financed out of
past contributions and can be claimed at
age 67. Maximum pension is SEK199
for men and SEK159 for women per
year.
. 2nd tier- supplementary and meanstested: designed to support the elderly in
need and is financed by current taxes:
SEK150 for men and SEK140 for
women.

Referring to the Beveridge Report of 1942, Hagan (2013) generally relates the term Beveridgean to the notions of universality, redistribution,
flat-rate and/or means-tested benefits.
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The 1935 Pension Reform
During the 1920s and the 1930s, the economic situation in Sweden, much like the rest of
the Western world, had been characterized by a severe downturn with the unemployment rate
reaching up to 30% (Hagen, 2013; as cited in Edebalk, 2003b). Also, poverty among the elderly
was visible yet again; and the birth rate in Sweden had been continuing to fall considerably
(Lundberg & Amark, 2001). The 1913 system indeed failed to lift the elderly out of poverty and
to deliver on its previous promise of a dignified retirement. Not only were the pensions too low
for retirees, but benefits could only be drawn after contributions had been accumulated for a long
period of time (Hagen, 2013). The shortcomings of the 1913 scheme and how to go about fixing
them were thus issues that were hotly debated between the socialist and Bourgeois parties. At the
center of the debate lied the question of whether to strengthen the social insurance- Bismarckian
character of the system, which favored a direct link between worker contributions and benefits at
the expanse of a more redistributive and tax-financed model. Evidently, the Bourgeois parties
preferred the former alternative as they feared the implications of a large redistributive system on
the then- future wellbeing of the Swedish economy; the left, on the other hand, favored the
expansion of overall benefit levels (Hagen, 2013). The latter perspective dominated, as can be seen
in Table 2, although a complete transition to a redistributive system had not yet materialized.

The 1946 Pension Reform (Folkpension):
Despite the relative generosity of the 1935 enacted pension scheme, poor relief was still
an important supplementary source of benefits for pensioners, approximately 30% of whom were
poor relief recipients between 1939 and 1947 (Harryson & Edebalk, 2010). This was the case
25

even when considering the cost-of-living indexation legislation that the Riksdag passed in 1937.
In 1938, the Social Care Committee was created to investigate a wide range of welfare policy
issues in Sweden (Harrysson & Edebalk, 2010; Hagen, 2013). Among the reports it had
produced, one specifically tackled and proposed three pension reform alternatives, which the
committee presented in 1945. The first and second alternatives both suggested a total benefit
amount of SEK1000 and only differed in terms of how much was to be paid out as a basic
pension and how much corresponded to a supplementary, means-tested amount. The third
alternative, on the other hand, called for a flat-rate benefit amount of SEK1000 per year for all
pensioners regardless of their incomes. What is important to note here is that all three pension
proposals completely departed from any insurance-like Bismarckian character: Benefits were to
be paid without regard to past contributions or income levels, and their funding was entirely taxbased20. Although it had received considerable support from across the political spectrum, the
implementation of the third alternative was by no means straightforward (Hagen, 2013).
Ironically, it was within the Social-Democratic government that a conflict on how to go about
financing the new scheme arose. While Moller, then Minister of Health and Social Affairs, who
during this period was greatly inspired by the recently published Beveridge Report, asserted that
the universal flat-rate pension system is necessary to improve the elderly’s economic standing,
Ernst Wigforss, then Minister of Finance, along with Per Albin Hansson, then Prime Minister,
viewed its institution, in its existing form, as a potential drag on the state budget, calling for the
incorporation of a means-tested component instead (Hagen, 2013). Nonetheless, the proposal

20

As can be seen in Table 3, contributions (1% of taxable income) had still to be collected in the form of
a “special tax” for psychological reasons (Hagen, 2013; p.31).
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was voted on unanimously by the Riksdag in 1946 and was expected to go into effect in 1948.
The 1946 Folkpension, according to Harryson and Edebalk (2010), was “the world’s first
universal social insurance based on citizenship rights.” (p.2).

The General Supplementary Pension (Den Allmanna Tillaggspensionen; ATP) of 1959
The 1946 old-age pension system indeed succeeded in improving the living conditions of
the elderly who no longer pursued poor relief as a source of support; however, benefits remained
modest and represented only about 20% of an ordinary worker’s wage in the industrial sector
(Lundberg & Amark, 2010; as cited in Palme, 1990). On one hand, retirees, particularly those
who during their working years earned higher incomes worried that their living standards could
not be sustained by the existing system (Hagen, 2013). Disparities in retirement income across
labor market groups also emerged as problematic; especially in the light of the economic
prosperity that Sweden had been enjoying in the late 1940s (Magnusson, 2000). While some
labor market groups successfully sought to negotiate private occupational schemes with
employers, others, notably blue-collar workers, were faced with the possibility of their living
standards lowered during retirement against their presently rising wages (Hagen, 2013). As an
initial attempt to tackle the need for a new earnings-related pension scheme, the Swedish
Insurance Supervisory Authority set up by the parliament presented a proposal in 1950 in which
it laid out its policy suggestions. The new system, the commission argued, ought to be
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mandatory, actuarially neutral21, and funded by current revenues (Pay-as-you-go22); (Hagen,
2013). The proposal was criticized for not taking into consideration the existing private
occupational schemes and was therefore never implemented.
The General Pension Commission, which, unlike its precedent, was representative of
various political parties and labor market groups initiated a second attempt to find a viable
solution for the earnings-related pension question, but it, too, failed to reach a compromise on
what became an ideologically-charged debate between the political parties (Hagen, 2013). In
1957, a national referendum was held in Sweden on the nature and design of the new earningsrelated pension system, and voters were presented with three policy options, which were
supported by different parties and labor market groups. The first policy alternative proposed that
all employees should receive an earnings-related supplementary pension financed by employers
and was supported by the social democrats, the communist party, and the LO (Hagen, 2013). The
Agrarian party supported a second alternative that suggested that in addition to raising the
Folkpension benefits, employees may voluntarily contribute into a supplementary earningsrelated system with the government guaranteeing the real value of benefits (Hagen, 2013). A
third option, supported by the Conservative and Liberal parties as well as the Employers’
Confederation, called for a voluntary supplementary pension system that would be run by
employers without the government guaranteeing the benefits’ real value (Hagen, 2013). As the
first alternative received 45.8% of the votes, short of a majority, against the 15% and 35.3% of

Actuarial neutrality “requires that the present value of accrued pension benefits for working an
additional year is the same as in the year before […]; benefits increase only by the additional entitlement
earned in that year.” (Queisser & Whitehouse, 2006; p.4).
22
PAYG systems are also referred to as unfunded. Benefits are financed by current revenues as opposed
to fully funded arrangements which are financed out of contributions built up over time (Hagen, 2013).
21
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votes that the second and third alternatives won respectively; the debate on the earnings-related
design intensified along ideological lines. This resulted from the fact that the percentage of votes
the social democrats and the Communist party received in the referendum was lower than the
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Table 3: Developments of Sweden’s Public Pension System (the 1946 and 1959 reforms)

Historical Context
. The Beveridge Report
(UK) formally comes out
in 1942, influencing the
ideas of key political
decision makers in
Sweden; notably, Moller.
. Poor relief was still an
important source for
benefits among the
elderly (Harryson &
Edebalk, 2010).

Policy Rationale
. Effectively address
the poverty question
among the elderly by
guaranteeing
pensioners a living
income without
further assistance
from poor relief.

. Sweden’s economy and
consumption levels had
been growing rapidly in
the late 1940s
(Magnusson,2000)
. Wages and standards of
living, especially those of
industrial workers,
increased.

. Sustain the living
standards of workers
into retirement.

Policy Proposals/ Alternatives
A new commission formed in 1938 to
investigate a wide range of welfare
policies. One commission report (1945)
introduced three alternatives for a new
pension reform:
. Basic pension and supplementary,
means-tested benefits amounting to
SEK200 and SEK800 respectively.
. Basic pension and supplementary
benefits of SEK600 and SEK400
respectively.
. Universal pension amount of
SEK1000 with means-tested housing
benefits.
. Mandatory supplementary earningsrelated pension system for all wage
earners funded by employers. The selfemployed may participate in a voluntary
pension plan.
. Voluntary plan that complements the
Folkpension benefits (which were to be
raised) funded by all employees and the
self-employed. The government
guarantees the real value of benefits.
. Voluntary plan for all employees and
the self-employed. Funding is set up
and administrated by employers. The
government does not guarantee real
value of benefits.

Policy Implemented
The 1946 Reform
(Folkpension):
Unanimous parliamentary
vote for the third
proposal. A pension
amount of SEK1000 paid
annually to all.

Description
A complete transition into the Beveridgean
model:
. All future benefits were to be financed by
existing taxes.
. Existing pension funds, including earned
interest, are used to fund current payments.
. Contribution rate is equal to 1% of taxable
income.
. Benefits can be claimed at 67.
. Married couples are entitled to only 60%
more in benefits than those claimed by single
pensioners.

The 1959 ATP Reform:
A supplementary
earnings-related scheme
that operates separately
from the Folkpension.

. For the full ATP annual benefit, pensioners
must have at least 30 years of reported
earnings, and the size of ATP benefit is
based on the top 15 income years (This will
be referred to as the 15/30 rule in later
sections).
. ATP benefits are financed by payroll taxes
on wages, paid by employers up to a ceiling.
. Benefits are indexed to price levels.
. Pension fees are collected in and
administered from the National Pension
Funds.

Source: Adapted from Hagan (2013, pp.29-46); Magnusson (2000; p.200), Harryson & Edebalk (2010; p.2)
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the combined percentages of their seats in parliament, rendering the opposition parties to appear
more successful23. Showing no signs of compromise, the partisan and heated debate on this issue
continued following the breakup of the social democratic-agrarian coalition in 1957 and the
subsequent dissolution of the government by then Prime Minister, Tage Erlander. The ensuing
social democratic minority government ultimately submitted its proposal but was also rejected by
the Riksdag’s Second Chamber. The situation became more problematic when the Second
Chamber elections of 1958 resulted in an evenly distributed number of seats between the social
democrats and the opposition parties24.
Surprisingly, the fate of the ATP scheme was decided by Liberal member of Parliament,
Ture Konigson, who declared that he would not partake in the parliamentary vote on the pension
scheme claiming that “it was more important to get some supplementary pension system into
place rather than a system according to his party lines” (Ibid; p.42). In 1959 and after a long
period of relentless discussions, the ATP scheme, much in line with the proposals of the first
policy option presented in the 1957 referendum, was passed by only one vote and was to go into
effect in 1960. ATP, a landmark of the social democratic triumph in welfare state politics,
according to Hagen (2013), “became a symbol for the social democrats’ idealistic struggle
against conservative forces, to which leading figures of the SAP repetitively and effectively
appealed to during the following decades.” (p.43; as cited in Lundberg, 2003).

23

The referendum results looked especially favorable for the Agrarian party given its poor performance in
the parliamentary elections during the 1950s (Hagen, 2013).
24
In fact, the social democrats won one seat more than their opponents in the 1958 elections, but the
social democratic speaker of parliament was legally unable to vote on the issue.
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The Politics of the ATP Reform and a New Political Realignment25
A discussion involving Esping-Andersen’s (1985) principle of political realignment is
required for a deeper understanding of the ATP controversy that unfolded in Sweden during the
later years of the 1950s.
During the 1940s, the SAP had been under a bourgeois attack in parliament for pursuing
unpopular economic controls leading to electoral losses in the 1948. The following decade was
characterized by a stagnation for the SAP and an alliance with the Agrarians from 1953 to 1957
focused on the mutually agreeable educational reform. What is crucial to mention is that the
farmers, the Agrarian party’s class base, were decreasing rapidly in number, all while whitecollar workers were on the rise. If the SAP succeeded in mobilizing this new center of party
electorate, the new wage-earner alliance would have a decisive say in the future of Sweden’s
social democracy. Behind the LO’s push for the new ATP supplementary pension during this
period was their desire to “help accumulate vast savings in collective funds…and…equalize the
pension status of all wage earners.” (p.108). These pension funds, the LO argued, would have to
be controlled publicly rather than through the private market and largely funded by employer
contributions, effectively lessening the financial burden on the state and the workers. It was the
public controlling of the funds, according to Esping-Andersen (1985), that triggered the
bourgeois parties’ resistance, arguing that this would be an exaggerated expansion of
government power over free enterprise. The bourgeois parties also rejected the plan’s
compulsoriness requirement and claimed the new proposal to be “an insidious scheme for

25

The following discussion is based on Esping-Andersen’s (1985) account in Politics Against Markets.
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creeping socialism.” (p.109). Following the breakdown of the SAP-Agrarian alliance, the
ideological animosity across party blocs intensified. A key player that was instrumental in
turning the course of events during this highly volatile political period was the trade union
federation for white-collar workers (TCO), which during the 1958 election campaign decided to
endorse the SAP. The Liberal party, which has been an notable receiver of the white-collar vote,
had no choice but to “break ranks with the other two bourgeois parties and move closer to the
social democrats…:The issue was now polarized in such a way that political lines corresponded
to class lines…” (Esping-Andersen, 1985; p.162). Other than the bill passing parliament in 1959,
by a one margin vote, the success of the ATP reform implied a significant victory for social
democracy in Sweden: it had now been able to mobilize and forge a new wage-earner coalition
that has the potential of strengthening the SAP’s future electoral fortunes, discrediting and
weakening the standing of the bourgeois parties all without jeopardizing on the support of its
traditional manual worker base.
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CHAPTER 4: THE 1998 PENSION REFORM

The Challenges of the ATP System
The 1959 ATP scheme was indeed a historical landmark for Sweden’s welfare policy
generally and for the Social Democrats, who were responsible for its enactment, particularly.
Pension benefits from ATP and the FP, according to Hagen (2013), accounted for an income
replacement rate of approximately 65% for an average worker compared to the OECD average
rate of 57% (as cited in Queisser and Whitehouse, 2005). However, leading up to the initial
efforts of its reform in the early 1980s, the ATP plan had been faced with serious economic
challenges that undermined its financial stability and called into question its long-term
sustainability26.
First, the benefit formula of ATP made the system very sensitive to changes in economic
growth. Because claimed benefits were predetermined by the previous earnings of pensioners
and indexed to price changes rather than wage growth, there was no link between the wages of
the working population and the pensions of the retirees. In other words, rising or declining wages
in the workforce had no effect on previously earned pension rights among the elderly; therefore,
any changes in labor productivity or wage growth subjected the pension system to fluctuations in
costs, given that the system operated in a PAYG framework.
The financial viability of the public pension system in Sweden was also threatened by changes in
the demographic makeup of the country. As Hagen (2013) points out, there were twice as many

26

This overview is largely drawn from the works of Hagen (2013), Konberg et al (2006), Schludi (2005),
and Sunden (2000).
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pensioners per single worker in 1994 as when ATP was implemented. By 2025, moreover, the
percentage of the population aged 65 or older was projected in 1994 to make up 20% of the
population (Konberg et al, 2006).
Another problem facing ATP that is of significance in this analysis is its adverse
distributional effects. One of the most celebrated aspects of ATP at the time of its
implementation was its attempt to redistribute income from high earners to lower wage workers
through the 15/30 rule. The distributional impact sought from ATP, however, proved inaccurate.
The 15/30 rule, in practice, rather distributed income from lower-wage workers who typically led
longer working lives with flat-life cycle incomes to higher-wage earners with shorter working
lives and rising incomes. Blue-collar workers, in particular, “with relatively flat-earning profiles
and long working careers (contribution years), and especially blue-collar women, were the losers
in the old system.” (Konberg et al, 2006; p.452).
A somewhat related problem to the adverse distributional outcome of ATP is the erosion
of loss-of-earnings principle that had taken place leading up to the 1999 pension reform. ATP is
designed to compensate pensioners based on their previous earnings up to a ceiling, which was
indexed to price levels rather than wage growth, and so long that a large fraction of workers’
incomes stayed below this cutoff point, ATP fulfilled its loss-of-earnings guideline (Hagen,
2013; p.59). Yet, ever since it had been implemented in 1960, wage growth in Sweden’s
economy meant that more and more workers earned higher wages, approaching the ATP’s
ceiling beyond which no pension rights were earned. This resulted in the supplementary
earnings-related ATP pension to operate similarly to a flat-rate benefit system (Sunden, 2000).
Other important problems facing the old public pension system in Sweden were labor market
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distortions and saving disincentives: Given the ATP’s design, workers were not necessarily faced
with lower pension benefits in case they chose to lower their supply in the labor market27;
furthermore, according to Hagen (2013) and Konberg et al (2006), household savings in Sweden,
in fact, declined as a result of ATP over the years.

An Overview of The Reform Process28
The reform process of Sweden’s pension system initially started in 1984 during the reign
of the Social Democratic minority government with the creation of the Pension Commission to
investigate the above-mentioned problems facing ATP. The new commission was heterogenous
in representation as it included members from all political parties, trade union, employer, and
pension organizations as well as other government and academic experts. At this period,
however, the political risk that lied in challenging the existence of ATP, especially for the SAP,
and the disagreements that prevailed within the commission prevented the latter from reaching
any fruitful results. The Pension Commission’s final report published in 1990 proposed modest
modifications to the existing system such as indexing benefits to wage growth and increasing the
retirement age all while keeping its original framework intact. It is worth noting that, around this
time, it was increasingly understood among the Swedish public that the existing system
necessitated reform as their trust in it began to decline (Konberg et al.,2006).
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In addition to the 15/30 and the income ceiling rules that provided for the possibility that a worker who
worked full-time for 15 years and part-time for another 15 could earn a pension comparable in size to that
of someone who worked full-time for 45 years, the introduction of a special supplement pension in 1969
for those with low or no ATP, was also a likely factor in the reduction of labor participation among
workers (Hagen, 2013).
28
Both the review of the reform process and the characteristics of the new system rely on the works of
Hagen (2013); Schludi (2005); Konberg et al. (2006); and Sunden (2000).
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It was not until the Social Democratic government was replaced by the non-socialist
Bourgeois coalition following its defeat in the 1991 elections that the pension reform took a
more consequential trajectory. Soon after it had formed, the new Centre-Right coalition
comprised of the Conservative, Liberal, Centre (formally known as Agrarian), and the Christian
Democratic parties created the new Working Group on Pensions committee, led by then Liberal
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Bo Konberg. Unlike the Pension Commission, the
Working Group was small and consisted exclusively of high-ranking members from the parties
in the Riksdag29 and other government experts without representation from any interest groups.
This move, according to Hagen (2013), was “quite unique and contrasted sharply to the Swedish
corporatist custom of formally incorporating labor market partners in social welfare reform
processes.” (p.81). Moreover, the small number of the Working Group’s members and their high
ranking status within their respective parliamentary parties in addition to the exclusion of labor
and pension organizations highlighted the government’s commitment to reach a compromise
regarding the pension reform rather quickly in an environment where more than a clash of
interests unfolded (Konberg et al., 2006; Hagen, 2013).
Based on the previous report produced by the Pension Commission, the Working Group
issued an initial report in 1992 outlining the economic guidelines upon which the new pension
system would operate; notably: strengthening the link between contributions and benefits,

29

All Seven parliamentary parties (Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrats, Center, Left, SAP, New
Democrats; a recently established right-wing populist party) had representation in the commission at this
stage. The Left party and the New Democrats, however, were opposed to the reform suggestions laid out
in the 1992 report and henceforth exited the Working Group (Schludi, 2005).

37

making the system more sensitive to economic growth, and adopting the life-income principle30
in the benefit formula (Schludi, 2005; Hagen, 2013). Within the Group and especially between
the non-socialist parties and the SAP, however, there were strong disagreements regarding the
structure, design, and the potential for privatizing some components in the anticipated reform. In
general, within the Bourgeois camp, the Conservatives hoped for a reduction in the Folkpension
(FP) scheme while encouraging private savings through establishing individual financial
accounts; the Liberals argued for strengthening the link between contributions and benefits; and
the Centre party and the Christian Democrats were in favor of the flat-rate benefit of the FP. The
SAP, on the other hand, were staunchly against a privatization that would diminish the public
nature of the pension system and were, according to Hagen (2013; p.) “determined to safeguard
traditional social democratic values and keep the bourgeois parties from implementing their ideal
pension system.” (as cited in Lundberg, 2001; Sunden, 2000). Compelled by the government to
reach a cross-party compromise, the members of the Working Group were nonetheless wellaware that the existing pension system could not be financially sustained and that a fundamental
-rather than incremental- change was bound to take place (Konberg et al., 2006).
After much negotiation, the Working Group published its final report in January of 1994
where a more concrete and agreed-upon version of the new pension system was laid out. A
proposal was submitted to parliament a few months later, and within the parliament, it enjoyed
more than 85% of support (Sunden, 2000; Schludi, 2005). In June of 1994, the reformed pension
legislation was formally adopted by the Riksdag, and in order to work out some remaining

30

When pension rights are gained on all income earned in a lifetime, we speak of life-income principle as
opposed to the loss-of-earnings principle, which in the case of the ATP scheme, corresponds to the 15/30
rule.
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financing-related issues, an Implementation Group was created in the same year. During the
subsequent SAP minority government and despite several drawbacks, the Implementation Group
submitted in 1998 its final report to Parliament; the latter passed the reform bill with an
overwhelming majority of support (Hagen, 2013) and was to go into effect the following year31.

The Characteristics of the New Pension System
The reformed pension system in Sweden is comprised of three components and is
characterized by the following:
•

The income pension: Constitutes the main component in the new system and is an
earnings-related scheme that replaced ATP; but unlike ATP, in which benefits are
calculated based on the top 15 income years (Loss-of-earnings principle), the
income pension enables workers to earn pension rights on all earnings including
social transfers such as those pertaining to unemployment or disability (Lifeincome principle). The financing of this component is a unique hybrid formula
that is contribution-based but operates in a PAYG basis. In other words,
contributions for each pensioner are recorded into an individual account and
annual contributions are used to finance current outgoing payments. The
contribution rate for the income pension is 16% and is paid by employees and
employers.

31

Several technical and political issues, nonetheless, remained unresolved up to this point. It was not until
2001, according to Schludi (2005), that a complete and final pension reform legislation was adopted by
Parliament.
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•

The premium reserve system (also referred to as a fully funded scheme): In fully
funded insurance plans, contributions are set up into individual accounts, and
these contributions are invested in market assets. Pension benefits, in this case,
then depend entirely on accumulated contributions as well as the investment’s rate
of return (Hagen, 2013). The contribution rate for the premium pension, however,
only amounts to 2.5% of earnings and it, too, is paid by employees and
employers.

•

Guaranteed pension: A means-tested basic guarantee for those with low or no
pension. It serves as a replacement for both the Folkpension and the supplement
pension. The latter was introduced in 1969 and was paid out to those with no or
low ATP. The guarantee pension is completely tax-financed.

•

The new pension system is linked to economic growth and demographic changes
in the population.

What Can be Said about the New Pension System?
Based on the information above, the new Swedish pension reform clearly advocates for a
tighter link between contributions and benefits. In the case of the fully funded component, in
which individuals are free to choose whether to invest their money into a private or public fund
(Schludi, 2005), this relationship is particularly strong. The guarantee pension, moreover, and
unlike its FP precedent, has lost its universalistic quality and follows a rather selective policy
application. If analyzed in light of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state classifications, a
worker’s social rights in this instance are closely dependent upon his/her market participation.
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Based on the stratified structure of the pension system, I am also compelled to argue that
market inequalities are inherently going to replicate in terms of claimed pension benefits. It is
due to these conditions that it is fair to conclude that the characteristics of the new
pension system are more in line with the definitional properties of the liberal classification.
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES

In regard to the 1998 pension reform and although it carries strong liberal features in
Esping-Andersen’s terms, as previously discussed, Sweden’s classification as a socialdemocratic welfare state, however, did not change throughout the 1990s’ neoliberal wave
(Lindbom, 2001). In Dismantling the Social Democratic Model? Has the Swedish Welfare State
Lost its Defining Characteristics? Lindbom (2001) explains that Sweden’s economy has suffered
a significant decline beginning in the early years of the 1990s, resulting in the Nordic country to
lead a negative GDP growth rate between 1991 and 1993 and unemployment rates to reach
12.5% in 1993 from 1991’s 2.1%. In 1998, however, Sweden’s economic standing improved,
and the country’s budget deficit turned into a surplus. Given the decade’s economic fluctuations,
the author ponders whether Sweden’s welfare state had retrenched into a liberal standing in light
of two competing propositions: (1) the globalization thesis which posits that increased
globalization, especially in the case of a small, open, and competitive economy such as
Sweden’s, should have restrained its government’s ability to maintain heavy social expenditures
and high tax rates; and (2) the welfare regime theory which argues that the popularity of social
programs would prevent any potentially radical restructuring of the welfare state.
In his analysis, Lindbom (2001) points out that welfare retrenchment operationally takes
place not when social spending is cut, but when a qualitative shift occurs in welfare schemes (i.e.
privatization, or increased dependence on social assistance, for instance). Specifically, he adopts-
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albeit modifies32- Esping-Andersen’s decommodification and stratification measures to first
compute and then compare Sweden’s regime standing in 1998 to its standing as well as the
average standing of the 18 industrialized countries in 1980, as reported in The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism (1990). If Sweden’s values change between 1980 and 1998, Lindbom (2001)
then compares them to the 1980 scores of comparable countries33.
Regarding replacement rates for all three systems, Sweden’s 1998 was on one hand
similar to its 1980 rate on average and on the other hand higher than the average value of the 18
countries in 1980. Concerning stratification, and even though Lindbom (2001) shows that
welfare state liberalization indeed unfolded in Sweden in the 1990s in the form of increased
means-tested programs and private pension and health expenditures compared to 1980, these
values remained below the 1980 average for the 18 countries and universalism in pension,
sickness, and unemployment benefits still dominated the Nordic country. It is in light of these
findings that Lindbom (2001) concludes that the Swedish welfare remains closer to a social
democratic type than to a liberal type.
The Swedish pension system, nonetheless, given that it has created a tight link between
contributions and benefits, both in its income pension and premium reserve components34, has

Instead of Esping-Andersen’s decommodification score, Lindbom (2001) uses replacement rates for
pensions, unemployment, and sickness cash benefits. Distinguishing between the social democratic and
liberal regimes, stratification, on the other hand, is measured based on indicators like spending on meanstested benefits as a percentage of total public spending and private pension and health expenditures
relative to each’s total spending.
33
In addition to social security programs, the author also includes social services in his analysis. This
sector, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
34
The income pension in which contributions are recorded in non-financial (notional) accounts and
finance current outgoing pensions in a PAYG fashion, is also structured such as these accounts are
accredited with a government applied uniform rate of return that is linked to wage growth and
demographic change (Capretta, 2018).
32
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been not only shown to having survived financial turbulence as was the case during the 2008
Great Recession (Malito, 2019), but is also projected to remain in permanent balance (Capretta,
2018). According to The Local (2019), moreover, Sweden had received a rating of B, ranking 5th
best in the world, by the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index in 2019, though the latter had
stated that the country’s pension system may be further improved by raising the state pension age
and ensuring that employees are also contributing to their employers’ sponsored schemes, to
name a few suggestions. Currently, the retirement pension age is flexible, giving pensioners the
option to withdraw their benefits between 61 and 67 years of age; however, under a new set of
reform rules, retirement age will be fixed at 62 in 2023 and then raised again to 64 by 2026
(Malito, 2019).

Can We Infer General Conclusions from this Study of The Swedish Welfare State?
Some liberals in the United States would like to “import” Swedish institutions and
implement them in this country. In light of the growing inequality and the generalization of
economic insecurities in American life since the 1980s, the impulse is readily understandable.
On the other hand, it should be understood that welfare state development in Sweden were the
result of a rather unique configuration of interrelated factors, many of which were and are not
present in the American context.
First, there is the ideological flexibility of the SAP manifested in the party’s
abandonment of a revolutionary and class-based political attitude and discourse to one that is
pragmatic, reformist, and cooperative. Secondly, there is the willingness of the farmers in the
1930s to work with the SAP within a democratic and parliamentary framework, granting the
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social democrats a favorable power position against the nonsocialist block, especially
considering the economic hardship of the era and the spread of fascist ideology across Europe.
The historical Swedish farmer-worker coalition, however, did not replicate in the case of the
United States. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), while the New Deal reform “was premised
on a similar coalition (forged by the Democratic Party) …the importance difference [is] that the
labor-intensive South blocked a truly universalist social security system and opposed further
welfare-state developments.” (p.30). The peaceful and gradual nature dominating the
development of political institutions in Sweden and the general tendency of its elites to engage in
bargaining and consensual politics (See Chapter. 2) is also a key factor. This was evident in the
evolution of Sweden’s public pension system as was previously demonstrated.
Also, it is worth noting, as Board (1970) pointed out in his The Government and Politics
of Sweden, that the Nordic country was strikingly homogeneous during the last century.
Religiously, this could be seen in terms of the Lutheran State Church of which, when he made
this observation, more than 90% of Swedes were members (Ibid). In addition to religion,
language and ethnic composition, as Board (1970) explained, were strikingly uniform and
although “there are some sectional and social-economic differences, … these for the most part
are not a source of political conflict.” (p.10). Sweden’s historical demographic homogeneity
during the years of welfare state building contrasts sharply with the racial and ethnic tensions
pervasive in American politics, past and present. Many social scientists have noted how racial
and ethnic diversity in America has undermined the social trust across groups necessary to build
solidaristic institutions (Katznelson, 1981; Quadagno,1994; Goldfield, 1997).
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It is notable that Swedish demographic homogeneity nonetheless has eroded in the recent
past with the influx of many immigrants and that conservative forces are growing in reaction to
these changes. In 2019, 2,634,967 residents out of the population of 10,327,589 in Sweden have
a foreign background35 (Statistik Data Basen; Sweden.se). Since 2014, moreover, Sweden
Democrats, a far-right populist party had become the third largest party in parliament, and in the
2018 parliamentary elections, its seat count jumped to 62 compared to the SAP’s 100 seats
(Tomson, 2020). The Sweden Democrats have been rising in popularity, and according to
Tomson (2020), their political narrative in recent years has been a warning against the increase in
the number of asylum seekers which in 2015 amounted to 162,877, many of whom are of
majority Muslim countries. While the solidarity embedded in the social democratic welfare state
remains popular with many Swedes, it remains to be seen just how far the conservative forces
can grow and the nature and extent of change they would bring to welfare state institutions if
they were ever to gain control over the national government.

35

Statistik Data Basen defines a resident with a foreign background as someone who is either foreign
born or born in Sweden with foreign parents.
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